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BREACH OF CONTRACT.
ant's friend "why he had not
settled the case and not allowed
the same to come into court:"
Rowe v. Canney, 139 Mass., 4I or
where the unsuccessful party knew
of the incompetency of a juror to
serve: Sellect v. Turnpike Co., 13
Conn., 453; or where a paper was
taken out by the jury with the pre-
sumed knowledge of the defendant:
State v. Nichols, 29 Minn., 357; or
where a juror, contrary to the ex-
press instructions of the Court,
which were known to the defend-
ant, accompanied the defendant to
his brewery: U. S. v. Salentine, 8
Biss. U. S., 404, the several verdicts
were set aside. See Pepper v.
Comm., 15 Pa., 468.
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DUFF v. RUSSELL NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS.
Injunction-Breach of Contract-Personal Services.
Defendant, an actress and singer, had contracted with plaintiff, a
theatrical manager, to appear in such operas as he should produce during
a certain season. Defendant was distinguished in her profession, and a
great artistic acquisition to any theatre producing comic operas. Plaintiff
had advertised defendant at great expense as a member of his company.
During such season defendant refused to perform in an opera produced
by plaintiff and she, at that time, had agreed to appear at a rival theatre
to the end of the season. Plaintiff unsuccessfully protested against this.
It was not possible for him to replace defendant by any other actress and
singer of equal repute; and, in consequence, he was likely to, and in fact
did, sustain irreparable damage. Held, that these facts were sufficient,
!irima facie, to entitle the plaintiff to an injunction to restrain defendant
from appearng at such other theatre. Held, also, that as the terms and
requirements of the defendant's contract rendered it impossible for her
to perform elsewhere without violating her contract, the fact that it did
not contain a negative clause binding her not to appear elsewhere, was
not ground for refusing plaintiff an injunction.
a 14N. Y. S., 134. Decided June 14, 1892.
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and largely intellectual, as in the
i case of literary work, or of mental
and physical faculties combined,
as in dramatic and operatic work,
or even of unusual physical pcwers,
as of athletes or gymnasts of special
ability, it is difficult and in many
cases impossible for a jury to form
an adequate estimate of damages.
Such services are individual and
be adequate.
It was formerly held that inas-
much as equity could not compel
performance of the affirmative part
of an agreement and oblige the de-
fendant to perform the services
agreed to be performed, it would
not attempt indirectly to secure
this end by enjoining the breach
of the contract, and compelling
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INjUNCTION To RuSTRAIN TH BReACH OV CONTRACT VOR
PERSONAL SERVICI S.
This question of whether or no peculiar, and damages for breach of
a court of equity will interfere by such contracts are not only difficult
injunction to prevent the breach to ascertain, but cannot with any
of a contract for personal services certainty be estimated. It has ac-
is one upon which the authorities )cordingly been finally settled that
have been, up to a comparatively where the contract provides for
redent date, exceedingly conflicting special unique or extraordinary
and irreconcilable. It is settled personal services, whether mental
that equity will not enjoin the vio- or physical, while a court of equity
lation of a restrictive covenant in . will not attempt to compel affirmS.
an ordinary contract for work and tive specific performance, since
labor, or a contract of employment that would be impracticable, yet it
between an artisan, a laborer, or a ,will still, restrain its violation by
clerk and their employer. For the i injunction, thus operating to bind
breach of such a contract the corn- j the parties to a fulfillment of their
plainaut must look to his danfages engagements, at least so far as they
at law as his sole redress, and his i cn be bound. In Metropolitan
remedy at law is deemed sufficient. Exhibition Co. v. Ward, 9 N. Y. S.,
In Carter v. Ferguson, 58 Hun. 779, N.Y..Sup. Ct., i89o, the Court
(N. Y.), 569, it was held that the said: "Whatever doubt may have
exercise of this equitable jurisdic- existed in the past, it is -now the
tion ought always to be limited to settled law of England and America
cases where the abilitie of the de- that when a person has entered
fendant are exceptional, so that his into a definite contract to render
place cannot readily be supplied, services to another of such a nature
for it would seem to be only under as not to be easily replaced, and
such circumstances that irreparable the loss of his services to the em-
damage can be occasioned to the ployer will be a loss not to be com-
plaintiff. This point is well illus- pensated for in damages, a breach
trated in Columbus Ball Club v. or a threatened breach of such con-
Riley (Ohio Corn. Pl.), 25 Weekly tract may be restrained by injunc-
Law Bull., 385, and also in the tion."
opinion of the Court in Cort v. / But in such cases the services to
Lassard and Lucifer, 18 Oreg., at : be performed must be individual
p. 227. i and peculiar because of their spe-
But where the services involve t cial merit or unique character; for
the exercise of powers peculiarly '. otherwise the remedy at law would
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him to abstain from performing
such services for other persons'
than the plaintiff. The earlier
cases upon this subject, such as
Kemble v. Kean, 6 Simons, 333;
Sanqurico v. Benedetti, i Barbour,
315; Kimberly v. Jennings, 6 Si-
mons, 340; Corsetti v. Rivafinoli,
4 Paige, 464; Hamblin v. Durne-
f6rd, 2 Edwards, 529, and the Penn-
sylvania case, Ford v. Jermon, 6
Phila., 6, which followed them,
would seem to have been ruled
upon the theory that because by
their nature such contracts do not
admit of compulsory specific per-
formance, therefore an injunction
should not be granted, inasmuch
as that remedy is only a substitute
for the other, and could only result
in an effort to cdmpel specific per-
formance, which might in the
sequel be altogether inefficient to
accomplish that result.
The impossibility of securing spe-
cific performance of such contracts
appears clearly to have been the
ground on which the Chancellors
in these earlier English and Amer-
ican cases refused to interfere in
behalf of the complainant. The
doubt expressed by Judge STORY
in regard to the force of this rea-
soning (2 Eq. jurisp., 7th ed., 958,
note 6) has been fully confirmed
by the more recent cases, both in
England and in this country, and
within recent years Kemble v.
Kean, and all the cases that fol-
lowed it have been overruled, as
well by the English tribunals as
by the courts of this country.
As to granting the injunction in
the absence of a negative covenant,
the remarks of Lord STIBoRNB in
Wolverhampton, etc. Ry. Co. v.
London, etc. Ry. Co., L. R. 16 Eq.
Cas., 440, are pertinent: "I can
only say that I should think it was
the safer and better rule to look in
all such cases to the substance and
not to the form. If' the substance
of the agreement is such that it
would be violated by doing the
thing sought to be prevented, then
the question will arise whether this
is the court to come to for a remedy.
If it is, I cannot think that ought to.
depend on the use of a negative
rather than an affirmative form of
expression." 
"
Acting upon the rule thus laid
down, and coming to the conclusion
that the complainants had a sub-
stantial equity, Lord SruoRi
assumed jurisdiction, though there
was no negative clause, and over-
ruled the defendant's demurrer to
the complaint.
The same rule was applied in
Montague v. Flockton, L. R. 16 Eq.
Cas., i89, where it was held that an
actor who entered into a contract
to perform for a certain period at
a particular theatre might be re-
strained by injunctionfrom perform-.
ing at any other theatre during the
pendency of his engaghment, not-
withstanding that the contract
contained no negative clause re-
straining the actor from performing
elsewhere.
But in Burton v. Marshall, 4 Gill.
(Md.), 487, upon a contract similar
in its provisions to that in Mon-
tague v. Flockton, it was held that
a court of equity could not be asked
to engraft upon the affirmative
agreement a negative stipulation
and restrain its breach by an injunc-
tion.
In Butler v. Galletti, 21 How.
Pr., 465 (18611, under an agreement
by the defendant, a danseuse, to
dance at the plaintifPs theatre or
where he should prescribe, with no
negative or restrictive clauses, the
plaintiff, on an alleged breach of
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the agreement by the defendant,
was notf.grgnted an injunction re-
straining the defendant from a vio-
lation thereof.
In Hamblin v. Dmineford, 2 Edw.
Ch. (N. Y.), 529, the agreement to
act contAined a negative covenant,
'and the billsought to compel spe-
cific performance, the court said:
"The Court can make no such
.order.. The only relief it. could
give would be to restrain this actor
from perfbrming elsewhere than at
the Bowery Theatre, and this would
leave the positive part of the agree-
mentuntouched. The parties must
be left to the law."
The reasoning upon which these
cases were decided has been over-
thrown by the later and better sus-
tained authorities, which hold that
where a person enters into a coh-
tract to render services for a rea-
sonable length of time, a court of
equity, although it cannot enforce
the affirmative stipulation by com-
pelling Iiim to perform these ser-
vices, will, nevertheless, interfere
to restrain the violation of the neg
ative stipulation by enjoining him
from giving to a third person the
services he has bound himself to
render to another.
It has been argued that this rule
does not apply where the contract
of service does not contain a nega-
tive clause that the party agreeing
to render the service will not per-
form like services for any other
person during the time covered by
the contract; that is, that he will
not break his contract But this
contention has been held to be
wholly untenable. Every express
promise to do an act embraces
within its scope an implied prom-
ise not to do anything which will
prevent the promisor from doing
the act which he has engaged to
do. .So that by the later decisions
relief may be allowed, even though
the contract of service or employ-
ment contains no negative or re-
strictive clause, if such a negative
element may fairly be implied from
the conditions of the contract.
Kerr on Injunctions, atp. 521, says:
"When the importation of a nega-
tive quality into an affirmative
agreemetit is not against the mean-
ing of the agreement, a court of
equity will import -the negative
quality and restrain the doing of
acts which are inconsistent with
the agreement." This principle
was applied by WooD, V. C., in
Webster v. Dillon, 3 Jur. (N. S.),
432.
In Lumley v. Wagner, i De G.
Mac. & J., 619, the defendant, a
public singer, agreed to-sing for
the plaintiff during three months
at his theatre, and during that time
not to sing for any one else. Lord
Chancellor ST. LuONARDs enjoined
her from violating her contract by
singing under another manager at
the Italian Opera, Covent Garden,
London, within the stipulated
period. There was in this case a
negative stipulaior-., Lord ST.
LZONAiRDS said: "I am of opinion
that if she (the defendant) had at-
tempted, even in the absence of
any negative stipulation, to per-
form at another theatre, she would
have broken the spirit and true
meaning of the contract as much
as she would now do with reference
to the contract into which she has
actually entered." Since the case
of Lumley v. Wagner the modern
doctrine has been well established
that such cases, being practically
without redress at law, are proper
subjects for the control of Chan-.
cery, and that the power to inter-
fere by the writ of injunction in
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such cases ought to be exercised in
order to prevent a flagrant breach
of good faith for which the suffer-
ing party would otherwise be
wholly without any adequate
means of redress. The argument
of Lord ST. LSoNxARDs would
seem to be unanswerable, that when
the reason why the Court should not
decree specific performance is not
that the plaintiff is iot entitled to it,
but merely the want of means to
compel performafice, a court of
equity ought not upon that ground
to refrain from doing what is clearly
within its* power, viz., to forbid a
performance which will violate a
contract with another person.
The decision in Lumley v. Wag-
ner has accordingly been generally
followed, both in England and in
this country: Waterman on Speci-
fic Performance, 117; Montague
v. Flockton, L. R., 16 Eq., I89;
Stiff v. Cassell, 2 Jur. N. S., 348;
Fletcher v. Montgomery, 23 Beav.,
22; Webster v. Dillon, 3 Jur. N. S.,
432; Rolfe v.* Rolfe iS Sim., 88;
Hills v. Crall, 2 Phill., 66; Fred-
ricks v. Mayer, 13 How. Pr., 566;
Hays v. Willow, II Abb. Pr. N. S.,
167; Daly v. Smith, 49 How. Pr.,
15o; McCaull v. Braham, i6 Fed.
Rep., 37.
In Daly v. Smith, where there
was an express contract to act, with
negative covenants, the Court held
that an injunction would lie to
restrain from performance at an-
other theatre in violation of the
existing contract with the com-
plainant. In McCaull v. Braham,
I6 Fed. Rep., 37 (1883), an action
was brought to restrain 'Lillian
Russell from violating her agree-
mentwith the plaintiff by singing
elsewhere than at the plaintiff's
theatre. The express contract con-
tained a negative covenant. The
Court held the case governed by
the decision in Daly v. Smith, and
granted the injunction. Justice
BRowxn said: "Contracts for the
services of artists or authors of
special merit are personal and pe-
culiar, and when they contain nega-
tive covenants which are essential
parts of the agreement, ag in this
case, that the artists will not- per-
form elsewhere, and the damages,
in case of violation, are incapable
of definite measurement, they are
such as ought to be observed in
good faith and specifically enforced
in equity. That violation of such
covenants will be restrained by in-
junction is now the settled law,
of England." In Ford v. Jermon,
6 Phila. Rep., 6 (1885), the agree-
ment to act contained no negative
covenant, and the bill sought to
enjoin the respondent from playing
at any theatre not under the man-
agement of the complainant, until
the season for which she had
agreed to serve him should have ex-"
pired. The bill was dismissed by the
court, Judge HAI - holding that
inasmuch as the case was not ohe
in which specific performance could
be secured, fulfillment'of the con-
tract could not be secured by an
indirect method of compulsion.
In Am. Ass.* Base Ball Club v.
Pickett, et al., 8 Pa. C. C., 232
(1890), it was held that where a
person enters into a contract to
,render services as a base ball
player for a reasonable time, a
court of equity, although it cannot
compel him to perform those ser-
vices, will nevertheless enjoin him
from playing for another person
during the time covered by the
contract. It is immaterial that the
contract does not contain a promise
not to perform like services for
any other person.
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The case of Harrisburg B. B.
Club v. Athletic Ass., 8 Pa. C. C.,
337 (189o), C. P. Dauphin County,
SIMONTON, P., J., following the
case of Ford v. Jermon, and over-
ruling that of Phila. Ball Club v.
Hallman, held that where a party
enters into a contract to render
services as a baseball player, a
court of equity will not enjoin
him from playing with another
company during the time covered
by the contract.
In Phila. Ball Club v. Hallman,
8 Pa., C. C. Rep. 57 (189o), the in-
junction sought was refused on the
ground of unfairness in the agree-
ment, but the dictum of Judge
THAYER considers the subject at
length, and holds that an injunc-
tion will lie, even in the absence
of a negative covenant.
"Upon this point of the case I
may remark that whatever differ-
ences may at a former period have
existed upon this subject in the
views of different judges and tribu-
nals, and whatever wavering or
contradiction may be apparent in
the earlier cases, in the adminis-
tration of this branch of equity
jurisprudence we are of opinion
that at the present time no doubt
can exist that it is a part of the
proper jurisdiction of every court
of equity to enjoin a person who
has covenanted or agreed to render
personal services of a particular
kihd for a definite period of time,
exclusively to another party, for a
valuable consideration, against a
breach of his engagement in cases
which will inflict a loss upon the
other party for which he can have
no adequate remedy at law, and
inasmuch as it is practically im-
possible -for courts, armed with
even the largest authority, to com-
pel the specific performance of
such contracts, they will neverthe-
less compel their performance as
far as lies in their power by re-
straining a defendant under such
circumstances from giving to an-
other the services which he has
engaged to give exclusively to the
party with whom he has con-
tracted."
Another late case is that of Pratt
v. Montegriffo, io N. Y. S., 903,
decided in 1890: This was an
action by Charles H. Pratt, man-
ager of the Emma Abbott Grand
Opera Company, against Agostino
Montegriffo. The defendant ap-
pealed from an order continuing
a preliminary injunction restrain-
ing him from violating his contract
with plaintiff. DANIELS, J., said,
referring to the early English and
American cases opposed to the
issuance of such injunctions: "But
since these decisions were made
the subject has received more de-
liberate consideration, and the in-
clination of the courts now appears
to be in a decidedly different direc-
tion, and the reason of the case
supports this inclination. For,
while the party cannot be obliged
to perform the contract he has
entered into by performing the
services he has agreed to render,
he may yet be restrained from
entering the service of a rival com-
pany, and rendering services to
that company, to the injury and
detriment of his employer under
the contract; and the only remedy
to prevent that is an injunction.
"It is entirely clear that the law
can afford no redress by way of
damages for the injury which the
party entitled to the benefit of the
agreement may sustain by the
other party's identifying himself
with a rival enterprise, and in that
manner diminishing the patronage
